Lawyers, Friends, and Money: Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic by Hollander, David B.
History Publications History
2016
Lawyers, Friends, and Money: Portfolios of Power
in the Late Republic
David B. Hollander
Iowa State University, dbh8@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/history_pubs
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, Political History
Commons, and the Social History Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
history_pubs/88. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Lawyers, Friends, and Money: Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic
Abstract
Rome’s transformation from a regional force in Latium into a Mediterranean superpower (4th to 1st centuries
BCE) was accompanied by an accelerated change of economic realities. The persistent influx of vast natural
and monetary resources from abroad deeply altered the basis of Rome’s military. As income skyrocketed, the
exercise of political influence at Rome became increasingly intertwined with issues of personal finance.
Despite claims for frugality, the political power of senatorial families was always determined through the
accumulation of wealth. By the 1st century BCE, the competition of these families for rank and recognition
was dramatically wrapped up with access to monetary capital and economic resources. When the republic
finally fell, this was also due to a financial crash that hit the very centre of Roman society. Examining monetary
and financial assets, this volume discloses how economic power and ‘real’ capital augmented the nature of
aristocratic power at Rome. Papers are grouped in three topical clusters: Currencies of Power, Money and
State Action, Wealth and Status.
Disciplines
Diplomatic History | European History | Political History | Social History
Comments
This book chapter is published as “Lawyers, Friends, and Money: Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic” in
Money and Power in the Roman Republic. Edited by H. Beck, M. Jehne, and J. Serrati, Collection Latomus
355 (2016) 18 – 25. Posted with permission.
This book chapter is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/history_pubs/88
Lawyers, Friends, and Money: 
Portfolios of Power in the Late Republic 
David B. HOLLANDER 
That a young Octavian could prevail over several more experienced and prominent 
men in the struggles of the late 40s and 30s is a testament to the forbidding com-
plexity of late Republican power dynamics. 1 Traditional forms of power - nobil-
ity, wealth, and high office - might suddenly become positive liabilities in the 
last century of the Republic. The proscriptions make this abund,antly clear: 
wealth, according to our sources, sealed the fate of many innocent men while 
their very dignitas hampered the ability of some former magistrates to flee unno-
ticed by bounty hunters (App., B.C. 4.29-30, 40, 48). In contrast, other changes 
happened so gradually that apparently few noticed them until literally slapped in 
the face. Lucius Veratius, observing that the fine for assault, established in the 
Twelve Tables, still remained in force, went around slapping men, accompanied 
by a slave who immediately gave his victims the requisite 25 asses, now rather 
meager compensation (Gell. 20.1.12-3). While the power of a slap had presum-
ably changed little in four centuries, the value of the Roman as had diminished 
substantially. In response, the Romans quickly developed a new means of 
assessing damages. It is the relationship between money and power in the late 
Republic that will be explored in this essay. Money demand theory, I will sug-
gest, provides a useful lens for understanding Roman power because power, 
like money, can take many forms and the 'exchange rates' are rarely fixed. 
While Roman historians have identified many varieties of power (political, 
social, legal, gender, economic), they rarely bother to define 'power.' Michael 
Mann's definition, that 'power is the ability to pursue and attain goals through 
mastery of one's environment',2 is a good starting point though it implies that 
only individual actors with specific goals exert power. Even though the focus 
here is on the power of individuals, it is undoubtedly the case that objects, 
institutions, and ideas also have power. 3 Working from Mann ' s definition, it is 
easy to generate a lengthy list of powers: official and legal forms such as impe-
rium, tribunicia potestas, and patria potestas, social forms such as the ability 
1 All dates BC unless otherwise indicated. 
2 MANN 1986: 6. 
3 HARRIS 2010: 564-78. 
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to call upon the assistance of friends, patrons, and clients, and economic forms 
such as the possession of coins, land, slaves, or credit. Noble ancestry, dignitas, 
glory, rhetorical skill, and even pearls were forms of power. 4 Valerius Maxim us 
gives some indication of the power of lies with the story of Sentius Satuminus 
Vetulo's escape from the triumvirs' proscription (Val. Max. 7.3.9). In contrast 
to other fugitives who hid in sewers, wells or even dung heaps to escape 
detection (App., B.C. 4.13, 22), Satuminus disguised himself as a praetor. 
Accompanied by fake lictors, apparitores, and public slaves, he brazenly made 
his way to Puetoli and then on to safety in Sicily by seizing carriages, ships, and 
lodgings along the way. 5 
The task of cataloguing all the forms of Roman power is theoretically endless 
and almost certainly thankless, but the most important forms may be grouped 
into a few big and partially overlapping categories: state-sanctioned power (the 
authority of magistrates in the courts, assemblies, and with armies; but also 
knowledge of the law and the ability to navigate legal and political institutions 
more generally), social power (influence wielded through patronage, friendship, 
family, and reputation), and economic power (the ability to bribe, corrupt, or 
create bonds of dependency and gratitude through gifts or loans). Put simply, if 
imprecisely, power was lawyers, friends, and money. While the categories are 
fairly straightforward, the relationships between them became destabilized in 
the late Republic. Some tools increased in importance while others declined. 
One of the most interesting changes in the balance of power was the vastly 
increased value of rhetorical ability beginning in the second century. The earliest 
indication of this phenomenon is in 161 when the senate told the praetor Marcus 
Pomponius not to admit rhetoricians and philosophers to Rome (Suet., Rhet. I; 
cf also Gell. 15.11.1). A few years later came Cameades ' famous embassy 
during which the philosopher's rhetorical ability so disturbed Cato the Elder 
that he sought to have the visiting Athenian removed from the city as quickly 
as possible. As Plutarch describes it (Cat. Ma. 22), Cato 'hated the fervor for 
oratory flowing into the city, fearing lest the young men ... prize the glory of 
speaking rather than that deriving from deeds and military service.' Rhetoric 
was a threat to more traditional sources of political power. By the first century, 
the change was irreversible. Despite a ban on Latin rhetoricians issued by the 
censors of 92 (Suet., Rhet. 1), rhetoric became a regular part of an upper class 
Roman education. Even leaders now mostly associated with military power, 
such as Caesar and Antony, spent time as young men studying in the east under 
Greek rhetoricians (Suet., Iul. 4; Plu., Ant. 2). Cicero, obviously, is the clearest 
example of the powerful potential of rhetorical ability in the late Republic. 
4 Crc., Brut. 7 likens oratio to arma. According to Pliny the Elder (Nat. 9.114), people 
called a pearl 'a woman's lictor in public.' 
5 Appian tells a similar story of Pomponius (B.C. 4.45) and also mentions two men 
who disguised themselves as centurions in order to escape (B .C. 4.46). 
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While his military career was unspectacular, 6 he won friends, clients, students, 
and high office by virtue of his speaking ability. It is not, of course, that rhetoric 
had been unimportant prior to the late Republic - Cato the Elder himself owed 
some of his success to his speaking ability 7 - but its potential had vastly 
increased. This development stems in part from the establishment of quaes-
tiones perpetuae (permanent criminal courts) in 149 and their expansion by 
Sulla in 81 (Cic., Brut. 106). The new courts provided an important venue for 
speakers who were not yet magistrates to display their abilities in public. 8 
Cicero began his career in 76 before just such a court speaking in defense of 
Sextus Roscius (Cic., S. Rose. 1). 
Another important shift in the balance of power, roughly contemporary with 
the rise of rhetoric, was the growing importance of the plebeian tribunes in 
Roman politics. The Gracchi provide the most notable example of this; their 
reform efforts, made possible by the tribunes' legislative powers, are too well-
known to require any elaboration here. Occasionally forgotten, however, is the 
fact that the trend started earlier. Tribunes jailed the consuls of 151, L. Licinius 
Lucullus and A. Postumius Albinus, for their harsh behavior in levying troops 
for a war in Spain (Liv., Per. 48). C. Curiatius did the same thing to the consuls 
of 138 (Liv., Per. 55; Cic., Leg. 3.20). Even the violent deaths of the Gracchi 
brothers did not deter later tribunes from wielding the full power of the tribunate. 
These tribunes include L. Appuleius Satuminus (103 and 100), C. Servilius 
Glaucia (101), M. Livius Drusus (91), and P. Sulpicius Rufus (88) - all of 
whom died violently. Sulla severely weakened the authority of the tribunes, 
however, after the office's restoration during the consulship of Pompey and 
Crassus in 70, tribunes continued to play a large and highly disruptive role in 
Republican politics down to the civil wars of the 40s. Publius Clodius is the 
most famous example from the later period. Of course, the laws passed by these 
and other tribunes further disrupted other aspects of the balance of power by 
redistributing land, changing the composition of juries, and so forth. 
Closely connected with the new prominence of tribunes in Republican poli-
tics was the increased willingness of politicians to resort to violence to achieve 
their aims. Here too there are many well-known examples. In addition to the 
murdered tribunes, there are the Sullan and Triumviral proscriptions, and, by 
the 60s, the frequent use of gangs - partially composed of gladiators - to gain 
political advantage or simply provide protection. 9 Lintott helpfully catalogues 
almost four dozen incidents of violence, nearly all from the last century of the 
6 BEARD 2009: 197 may be right to accuse critics of never treating Cicero 's military 
career seriously but his accomplishments are hardly impressive in comparison to many 
of his peers. 
7 PLU., Cat. Ma. 1.3; cf. DENIAUX 2006: 408. 
8 DAVID 2006: 427. 
9 VILLE 1981: 291-3. 
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Republic. 10 Though he acknowledges that 'Roman tradition tolerated and even 
encouraged violence in political and private disputes' 11 and that the Romans 
'considered it an essential constituent of libertas that a man should be allowed 
to use force in his personal interest to secure what he believed to be his due', 12 
Lintott nevertheless sees a 'surge of violence in the late Republic ' which the 
state was unable to effectively counter. 13 
Even the Roman patron-client system seems to have lost some of its force in 
the late Republic, although here the evidence is less clear-cut. In 139 the Lex 
Gabinia established the secret ballot for elections and three subsequent laws 
extended it to trials and legislation by 107 B.C. 14 As Cicero (Leg. 3.33-5) makes 
clear, the Roman nobility regarded these laws as depriving them of their influ-
ence over the people, in other words preventing them from ensuring that their 
clients supported them politically. 15 As tribune of the plebs, a young Gaius 
Marius also passed a law designed to limit upper-class influence during the 
voting process and did so in part by threatening to imprison a consul (Plu., Mar. 4). 
However, Erich Gruen has cast strong doubt upon whether these measures actu-
ally changed anything. He points out that ' [ w ]ritten ballots gave the electorate 
a sense of libertas, but the choices available to them were generally men of the 
same established families who had run the state for many generations.' 16 Peter 
O'Neill makes a similar point in a discussion of informal popular gatherings 
(circuli) at Rome, observing that the Roman elite were able 'to maintain an 
ideology that stressed the theoretical power of the populus Romanus while 
allowing the people only a restricted role in constitutional politics.' 17 
Another incident from early in the career of Gaius Marius suggests a differ-
ent sort of challenge to the established patron-client relationship. At a trial, 
Gaius Herennius sought to avoid testifying against Marius, appealing to the law 
against the practice of patrons testifying against clients. Marius responded by 
denying that he was still a client of Herennius since he had been elected to 
office. Plutarch claims (Mar. 5), however, that Marius was wrong and that only 
curule offices dissolved prior bonds of patronage. Marius' subsequent relation-
ship with Q. Caecilius Metellus as well as Sulla's later conflict with Marius 
suggest at the very least that patronage relationships were no match for political 
ambition. There is plenty of evidence indicating that patron-client relationships 
JO LJNTOTI 1968: Appendix A. 
II ID. 4. 
12 ID. 204. 
13 ID. 4. 
14 The three subsequent Jaws were the lex Cassia of 137 (for the extortion court), lex 
Papiria of 131 (for legislation), and lex Coelia of 107 (for treason cases). 
15 WALLACE-HADRILL 1989b: 70; DENIAUX 2006: 413. 
16 GRUEN 1991: 261. For further discussion of this issue cf YAKOBSON 1995: 426-42. 
17 O'NEILL 2003: 163. 
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remained very important in the late Republic 18 but, as Wallace-Hadrill suggests, 
a number of factors, most notably 'the massive advance of bribery ... struck at 
the heart of the traditional patronage system.' 19 
Bribery brings us finally to the subject of money. There was a dramatic 
increase in the importance of money in Roman politics and society in the late 
Republic. An array of evidence attests to this development but efforts to combat 
luxury and corruption are representative of the broader trend. Starting in the 
early second century, there seems to be a growing concern with conspicuous 
consumption, particularly at banquets. In 182, two years after Cato the Eider's 
censorship, there appeared the first in a series of sumptuary laws: the lex Orchia 
which limited the number of guests at banquets. 20 The lex Fannia of 161 lim-
ited what could be spent on a banquet and banned certain foods. 21 The lex Didia 
of 143 applied the rules of the lex Fannia to Italy as a whole and punished 
guests as well as hosts for excesses (Macr., Sat. 3.17 .6). Sumptuous banquets 
were a way to forge political alliances and put the guests in one's debt. The 
lex Antia of 71 illustrates this function since the law banned magistrates from 
attending banquets (Gell. 2.24.13; Macr., Sat. 3.17.13). As Emanuela Zanda 
puts it, 'Sumptuary laws are the weapons of self-defense used by the Roman 
ruling class to protect the base of its own power.' 22 Related to these sumptuary 
laws were the anti-corruption measures which began in 181 with the lex 
Cornelia Baebia de ambitu (Liv. 40.19) and continued down to the end of the 
Republic. 23 Indirectly, through banquets, or directly, through various forms 
of bribery, ambitious Romans were using money to increase their social and 
political clout. It is not that money had been considered an unimportant form of 
power prior to the second century but that the immense wealth amassed by the 
Romans in the late Republic changed the scale on which it operated. 
Given the shifting balance of powers, 24 it is hardly surprising that some 
Romans badly miscalculated in trying to protect their interests. Gaius Verres' 
encounter with Cicero provides one illustration of this sort of miscalculation. 
When Cicero prosecuted him for extortion in 70, Verres was a successful 
18 Pompey, for example, raised an army from his clients in the 80s (PLU., Pomp. 6; 
APP., B.C. 1.80). Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus drew on his coloni to man ships in 49 
(CAES., Civ. 1.34). 
19 WALLACE-HADRILL 1989b: 71. 
20 MAcR., Sat. 3.17.2. I follow ZANDA 2011: 51, regarding the laws passed during the 
Second Punic War as 'wartime measures' rather than 'sumptuary laws in a strict sense.' 
21 GELL. 2.24.1; PLIN., Nat. 10.71.1; MACR., Sat. 3.17. 
22 ZANDA 2011: 70. Censors also occasionally targeted the same kinds of excess. 
23 Later ambitus (bribery) laws include the lex Cornelia Fuluia (159 B.C.), lex Cor-
nelia (81), lex Aurelia (70), lex Calpurnia (67), lex Tullia (63), lex Licinia de sodaliciis 
(55), and lex Pompeia (52). Cf LINTOTI 1990: 1-16; ROSILLO-L6PEZ 2010: 70-4. 
24 Many other examples could be added to the changes discussed here, such as the 
effect of the changing composition of the Roman electorate in the period after the Social 
War. 
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veteran of nearly fifteen years of Roman power struggles. Despite initially siding 
with the Marians in the civil war of the 80s, he had gone over to Sulla and appar-
ently thrived under the new regime, gaining a praetorship in 74 and serving as 
governor of Sicily for three years. 25 According to Cicero (V err. 1.40), Verres 
frequently declared to many listeners in Sicily that he sought money not just for 
himself but had the revenue of his tenure divided into three portions: one year's 
worth, if he was fortunate, for himself; another year's for his patron and defend-
ers; and a third portion, the largest, for his judges. This pecunia, in addition 
to a powerful friend (hominem potentem) would, Verres believed, protect him. 
Furthennore, Verres had attempted to manipulate the legal system so that he 
could stand trial under the most favorable circumstances possible. 26 In other 
words, Verres' hope lay in lawyers, friends, and money. But there was one 
more dimension to Verres' defense: statues. He had forced the Sicilians to set 
up many honorific statues; 'his statues are everywhere', Cicero says (Verr. 
2.2.154). Verres knew that these statues would cast doubt on any accusations 
that he had extorted money from the Sicilians (Cic., Verr. 2.2.168). Why would 
they honor him if he had mistreated them? 27 However, in this instance, all these 
forms of power were no match for Cicero's rhetoric. 28 Verres fled during the 
trial, living out the rest of his life in exile in Massalia. 29 
Cicero himself would experience many defeats in the last decades of the 
Republic, but few are as revealing with respect to power dynamics as his encoun-
ters with Sextus Cloelius, a somewhat obscure figure, often described (if men-
tioned at all) as the leader of Publius Clodius' gang. 30 In this capacity, Cloelius 
was responsible for a considerable amount of violence but that is where the 
resemblance to the stereotypical modern gang leader ends. He was also a scriba, 
an official scribe (Ase., Mil. 33.6); he wrote laws passed by Clodius (Cic., Dom. 
83); briefly administered Rome's grain supply (Cic., Dom. 25); and once caught 
and returned to Rome a fugitive Armenian prince (Ase., Mil. 47.12-26). Cloelius 
was neither a senator nor an equestrian yet he wielded considerable power. 31 
And he wielded it without (apparently) great wealth. This clearly frustrated 
Cicero, our main source for Cloelius' activities. He expresses his frustration in a 
25 COVINO 2012: 6968. 
26 This involved delaying the trial and finding a more sympathetic prosecutor. Cf. e.g., 
PLU., Cic. 1; Crc., Caec. 29; ID. Verr. 1.31. 
27 Cf. TANNER 2000: 32-3, 48. 
28 Plutarch, it is true, claims Cicero won by not speaking (Cic. 7), but this remark 
simply refers to the fact that Cicero, using a procedural ploy, opted against beginning his 
prosecution with a long speech. 
29 According to Pliny the Elder (Nat. 34.6), Antony had Verres killed in the proscrip-
tions of 43 in order to acquire his Corinthian bronze. 
30 On the 'rediscovery' of Sex. Cloelius cf. SHACKLETON-BAILEY 1960: 41-2; ID. 1981: 
383. For doubts, cf. FLAMBARD 1978: 235-45. 
31 DAMON 1992: 227-50, discusses Cloelius' status and collects all the references to 
him. On the ordo scribarum, cf PURCELL 1983: 125-73. 
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speech in defense of Caelius, delivered in 56. According to Cicero, Cloelius had 
burnt down a temple, set fire to the census and other public documents, destroyed 
Cicero's own house, set fire to his brother' s house, and tried to get a gang of 
slaves to bum down the entire city. But Cloelius was acquitted! Cicero (Cael. 78) 
cannot understand how this is possible or at least thinks it completely unfair that 
Cloelius wields such power despite being, as he puts it, 'without money, without 
credit, without hope, without home and without resources' (sine re, sine fide, sine 
spe, sine sede, sine fortunis). It is tempting to dismiss Cloelius as merely an 
agent of Clodius and no doubt that relationship was of great importance, but 
Cloelius continued to wield power after Clodius' death. In 52 B.C., following 
Clodius' murder on the Appian Way, Cloelius, at the head of an angry crowd, 
took Clodius' body and cremated it in the Senate house, burning down the 
building in the process along with a nearby basilica (Cic., Mil. 33; Ase., 
Mil. 33.5-9). This, finally, gets Cloelius convicted and exiled (Ase., Mil. 55-6). 
But he returned to annoy Cicero once more in the 40s, recalled thanks to Marc 
Antony. We last hear of him in October of 44; Cicero thinks that he is up to 
something, but is not sure (Att. 15.13.3). Though much remains uncertain about 
Cloelius, his successes indicate that someone could wield great power without 
great wealth. It is likely that this was due in part to his connection with Rome's 
collegia whose political activity had led to a crackdown in 64. 32 On 1 January 58, 
Cloelius presided over the ludi Compitalicii, a job previously held by magistri 
collegiorum. 33 Clodius restored the collegia shortly thereafter. 
The careers of Verres and Cloelius show that, while money certainly was an 
expected form of power, it was not an essential one. Cicero is able to overcome 
Verres' money, but is surprised that Cloelius manages to protect himself with-
out great wealth. In Cicero's discussion of these men, he imagines them wield-
ing portfolios of power, composed of a range of assets (money, patrons, fides, 
etc.). Verres has lawyers, friends, money, and statues while Cloelius should 
have money, a house, and credit. Cicero seems to conceptualize power in much 
the same way that economists think about the demand for money. Demand 
theory conceives of money as simply one form of wealth an individual might 
choose from a portfolio of assets; in response to actual needs as well as poten-
tial risks and rewards (called transactions, precautionary, and speculative 
motives), an individual adjusts his or her holdings, converting - with attendant 
transaction costs - assets into one another in order to achieve financial goals. 34 
32 Ase., Pis. 7.9-11. Despite Cicero's claim (Pis . 9) that the members of these pro-
fessional associations were the city's dregs and slaves, the collegiati, while not wealthy, 
must have been quite well off compared to the urban poor. 
33 Cle., Pis. 8; Ase., Pis. 7.16-21. Clodius' law revoking the ban on (some) collegia 
had not yet been passed and it is not clear what, if anything, Cloelius was a magister of 
at this point. For discussion of Cloelius' status, cf. DAMON 1992: 232 n. 16. For the 
collegia ban, cf. SALERNO 1984: 615-31. 
34 SERLETIS 2001: 79. Cf. also HOLLANDER 2008: 122-5. 
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Verres, one might say, trades some of the actual power of his governorship for 
'precautionary' forms of power: money to bribe judges and statues to intimidate 
would-be prosecutors. 
No one better illustrates the advantages of widely diversified holdings of 
power than Julius Caesar. During Sulla's proscriptions he remained safe by 
using money to bribe the bounty hunters while friends secured a pardon. 35 
Caesar's rhetorical ability also served him well early on, whether it was in court 
prosecuting - unsuccessfully but nevertheless impressively - Dolabella in 77, 
or on the rostra eulogizing Julia and Cornelia in 67. 36 Even statues may have 
played an important role: Plutarch (Caes. 5.2, 6.1-2) reports that Caesar, as a 
quaestor and aedile, used dx6ve:~ of Gaius Marius to gamer popular support. 
But it is the role of money most of all in his 'portfolio' that shows how inno-
vative Caesar was in amassing power. Caesar borrowed heavily in the early 
stages of his career and spent the money on gladiators, banquets, and other 
spectacles, tools of power and the means of acquiring more. Of the young, 
heavily indebted Caesar, Plutarch comments (Caes. 5.8-9) that 'with his lavish 
expenditures, he appeared to be exchanging a lot of money for an ephemeral 
and trifling glory, but was really buying the greatest things for a small price.' 
In other words, Caesar speculated in power, using credit to buy the esteem and 
gratitude of the people, things offering a long-term 'growth potential' in power. 
If economics offers a helpful lens with which to observe Roman power 
dynamics, it is also salutary for economic historians to take account of money's 
important role in the realm of power. The demand for coins and other forms of 
money was based not only upon the ability it gave one to purchase goods and 
services, but also on the security it could provide. In the modem western world 
of substantial police forces, clearly defined rights and state-subsidized assis-
tance such as public defenders, it is easy to overlook the vulnerability of the 
average Roman to violence. When we speculate about Roman demand for coin-
age, we need to consider the demand for security. The disruption of traditional 
forms of power in the late Republic undoubtedly promoted monetization. 
Money may have failed Gaius Verres but it served many other Romans quite 
well and was unlikely to let you down as spectacularly as Caesar's reliance on 
the power of gratitude ultimately did him. Judging from the sheer number of 
anecdotes preserved, proscription tales were quite popular under the Empire, a 
kind of 'zombie apocalypse' genre for the Roman reading public. What does 
one do when one's wife, slaves, friends, and acquaintances suddenly become 
potential murderers and informers? Many Romans must have observed the utility 
of portable, impersonal cash under those circumstances. 
35 SUET., Iul.1.2; PLU., Caes. 1.6-7, gives a slightly different version of events. 
36 Suetonius (Jul. 55) says that after the Dolabella prosecution, Caesar was considered 
one of the best advocates. Cf also PLU., Caes. 4. 
